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EXHAUSTION AND THE LIMITS OF REMOTE-CONTROL
PROPERTY
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING t
ABSTRACT

In this Article I argue that intellectual property (IP) exhaustion
should be understood against the backdrop of a long history of skepticism toward what I call "remote-control" property rights. IP is not the
only field of law that gives remote rights-holders the ability to constrain
the behavior of other people to use things in their rightful possession.
Tangible property law-in particular the law of servitudes-features
similar mechanisms, but hems them in with doctrinal limitations. Looking to this body of law helps us more clearly to recognize remote-control
property's benefits and costs and, thus, to articulate a rationale for IP
exhaustion as a limitation on remote-control IP. At the same time, remote-control IP is special. Restrictions on the use of works of creativity
and invention have implications for the promotion of progress of science
and the useful arts. It is especially important that such restrictions not be
ratcheted up solely at the whim of IP owners attaching labels to embodiments of their works. Nor should such restrictions be left solely to generally applicable commercial law without regard to IP's special policy concerns. Instead, courts and Congress should continue to absorb the wisdom of the common law of tangible property while crafting an IPspecific exhaustion policy that is attentive to the specific costs and benefits of remote-control IP.
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INTRODUCTION

The law of intellectual property (IP) exhaustion is rightly informed
by a long history of skepticism toward what I call "remote-control property rights." Property rights that give owners the ability to control how
other people use assets in their rightful possession are potentially confusing, subject to obsolescence, and sometimes burdensome to third parties.
In some cases, these costs can be mitigated in ways that make remotecontrol property rights beneficial on balance. The evolution of the law of
land servitudes-which can be very useful tools for long term land-use
planning-demonstrates this possibility. By contrast, longstanding judicial hostility toward personal property servitudes suggests that remote
control is not always reasonable.
So what about remote-control IP? The entire logic of this field of
law is based on the notion that remote-control property rights can be
worthwhile. Every copyright and patent gives its owner some ability to
control the use of objects possessed by other people. It prevents possessors of books from reproducing their pages, for example. The theory of
IP is that the advantages of this control, in the form of incentives for authorship and invention that promote progress, outweigh the disadvantages. But IP rights are limited. And one of those limitations, the doctrine of exhaustion, operates to constrain the reach of an IP owner's remote control over other people's tangible property.
Generally speaking, exhaustion allows owners of tangible objects
embodying IP to use those objects in ways that do not produce additional
copies or new works; owners may also transfer the objects they own to
others. These activities can benefit tangible property owners, and the
property system as a whole, without cutting to the core of IP owners'
need to limit ruinous competition. IP exhaustion can thus be understood
to maintain IP's balance between remote-control property's benefits and
costs.

2016]

THE LIMITS OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY

953

This balance is often described as one between the rights of IP owners and the personal property rights of the owners of tangible things. The
purpose of exhaustion, on this view, is to ensure that IP owners' rights do
not unduly interfere with the freedom from remote control that owners of
personal property would have in the absence of IP. A variation of this
view holds that exhaustion defines the "statutory domain" of IP, ensuring
that this specialized statutory body of law does not interfere unnecessarily with generally applicable commercial law.' Proponents of both of these views typically suggest that owners of objects embodying IP (e.g.,
books) should be treated, to the greatest extent possible, the same as
owners of objects that do not embody IP (e.g., doorstops).
Here I begin to articulate a third view: exhaustion does not merely
ensure that owners of books have most of the same rights as owners of
doorstops. In some important cases, it should ensure that owners of
books have more rights than owners of doorstops. The premise of IP is
that books are more important than doorstops. It is thus more important
that they be used instead of wasted, preserved instead of destroyed, read
with autonomy instead of surveilled, and built upon instead of ignored.
Although my focus here will be on copyright, much the same is true for
objects embodying patented inventions. In both cases, IP exhaustion can
be deployed to give owners of these special objects immunity from the
kind of remote control that would constrain the objects' use and diminish
their value.
I start with an abridged history of the law and policy of servitudes,
explaining how these forms of remote-control property have been somewhat reluctantly enforced when applied to land and largely resisted when
applied to chattels. This section explains how concerns about notice and
information costs, "dead-hand control," and the "problem of the future,"
and negative externalities have shaped this evolving body of law. It then
explains the historical, doctrinal, and theoretical links between resistance
to chattel servitudes and intellectual property exhaustion. Next it reviews
several recent strands of scholarship. One strand claims that resistance to
chattel servitudes was ill-considered in its heyday and is anachronistic
today, and that exhaustion should be revisited in light of this critique.
The second strand of scholarship claims that resistance to chattel servitudes reflected legitimate policy concerns that should continue to shape
exhaustion doctrine today, and even that exhaustion itself is an evolving
common law doctrine. The third, most recent strand argues that exhaustion does not reflect a common law tradition at all but is rather an independent doctrine defined and influenced only by the IP statutes themselves. I conclude with my own arguments about the continued relevance
of the policy lessons of personal property servitudes to the future of ex1.
John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2016).
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haustion, and about how exhaustion might transcend its common law
origins, leading courts to resist remote control over books even if they
enforce remote control over doorstops.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY

Start by considering a classic passage from Justice Holmes's 1908
concurrence in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,2 in
which he considers that nature of copyright as a property right:
The notion of property starts, I suppose, from confirmed possession
of a tangible object, and consists in the right to exclude others from
interference with the more or less free doing with it as one wills. But
in copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The
right to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned,
but is in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the spontaneity of men where,
but for it, there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as
they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or
tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand
miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the
wrong. It is a right which could not be recognized or endured for
more than a limited time and therefore, I may remark, in passing, it is
one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as
the authorities now agree.3

In drawing the contrast between copyright and paradigmatic possessory property rights in tangible objects, Justice Holmes emphasizes the
non-possessory, "in vacuo" nature of copyright.4 Copyright owners can
control strangers from afar, unconnected to any object possessed by the
copyright owner. Copyright owners are thus unlike owners of possessory
fee simple interests in land, whose rights to exclude generally impact the
limited universe of people who come into contact with the physical
boundaries of the owner's parcel.
Justice Holmes alludes to another apparent copyright anomaly: although copyright owners are not necessarily possessors, the people whose
spontaneity is restrained by copyright are typically in possession of tangible objects-books, sheet music, or other manifestations of the copyrighted work.5 As to these tangible objects, copyright operates not as an
instrument of freedom from interference for the possessor, but rather the
opposite: an instrument of restraint wielded by strangers-copyright
owners-via remote control. Copyright thus strikes Justice Holmes as an
odd sort of property right in that instead of liberating people to use their

2.
209 U.S. 1 (1908), supersededby statute, Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90
Stat. 2541, 2541-42 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
3.
Id. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
4. See id.
5. See id
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. where, but for it, there

would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit." 6
Copyright owners' power to control how remote strangers use objects in their possession is not as extraordinary as this passage suggests,
however. Of course copyright shares this characteristic with patent and
trademark. Beyond IP, copyrights are similar in this regard to a whole set
of remote-control property interests that give their owners the right to
control use of assets possessed by other people.7 Servitudes are the most
prominent example.
A servitude, which can take the form of an easement, real covenant,
or equitable servitude, is a non-possessory property interest that gives
its holder the right to use an asset-typically land-in specified ways, or
to object to specified uses of it, or to insist on specified behavior connected to it. The asset is encumbered by the servitude, such that the servitude's burdens "run[] with" the asset, "pass[ing] automatically to successive owners or occupiers." 9 Unlike a mere contractual agreement to

refrain from operating a gas station in a residential neighborhood, for
example, a servitude is enforceable against successors in interest.i 0
Therefore, if you grant your neighbor an effective servitude, she will be
able to enforce the restriction against you and subsequent owners of your
land. The benefit of a servitude connected to land typically runs to successors as well-from your neighbor to the next owner of her house." As
Carol Rose puts it, "[t]he greatest overall advantage of servitudes is that
they give stability to property arrangements over both time and space."' 2
The stability that servitudes produce can be especially valuable for
land-use planning. Land is, of course, immobile and enduring. It is often
important for people who invest in land to be able to predict how surrounding land will be used far into the future in order to make investments that will coordinate rather than conflict, with adjacent activities.1 3

6.

Id.

7.
See generally Gerald Komgold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property
Law's FunctionalEquivalents, 66 TEX. L. REv. 533 passim (1988).
8.
The Restatement simplifies this traditional three-part classification into two: affirmative

easements and covenants running with the land (the latter category including servitudes that had
traditionally been classified as negative easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES

§§

1.1-14 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

9. Id § 1.1(1)(a).
10. Id. §5.1.
11.
Id
12.
Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 296-97 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
13.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 407 (2002)
("[T]he spatial fixity of individual parcels of real property causes the value of those parcels to be
necessarily dependent on the uses made of neighboring parcels."); Henry Hansmann & Marina
Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95, 101 (1997) (noting "the potentially large advantages in coordinating the uses of
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In recognition of these benefits, courts have long enforced land servitudes and some other varieties of remote-control property rights. Nonetheless, Justice Holmes's contention that property rights with such features could only be the product of statute rings somewhat true. Judges
have greeted most non-possessory property rights with suspicion and
hemmed them in with doctrinal limitations. 14 Reviewing some of this
history and doctrine can help us to understand the challenges posed by
intellectual property law's remote-control property rights, as well as the
origins of the exhaustion doctrine as a limitation on that remote-control.
A. The Evolution ofLand Servitudes
The land-use planning needs of the Industrial Revolution triggered
the development of modem Anglo-American servitude law.' 5 Increased
urban density and the potential for conflicts between neighboring property owners prompted a variety of attempts to coordinate land uses through
durable private arrangements.' 6 Nineteenth century English courts reacted with ambivalence, however, establishing a complicated scheme of
servitude classifications and accompanying doctrinal limitations.17
Servitudes came to be classified into the three major categories of
easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, with each category
subject to convoluted rules limiting formation, subject matter, and enforceability.' 8 As I describe in prior work,' 9 tracing the evolution of
modem servitude law reveals several rationales for this type of hostility
and the limiting doctrines that it produced. I have organized these rationales into three broad categories: those related to notice and information
costs; those related to dead-hand control and other aspects of the "problem of the future"; 20 and those related to harmful externalities. 21
parcels of property that are, by their nature, bound in a spatial relationship to each other regardless of
their separate ownership").

14.
See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 891924 (2008) (documenting pervasive skepticism).
15.

Easements existed in Roman law and running covenants were recognized as early as

Spencer's Case, (1583 KB) 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, in 1583, but "[u]ntil the Industrial Revolution greatly increased the use of servitudes, the common law did not develop a general theory of
easements or servitudes." Susan F. French, Design Proposalfor the New Restatement of the Law of
Property Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1988); see also Uriel Reichman, Toward a

Unified Concept ofServitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (1982).
16.
See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 262 (2d ed. 1986); French,
supra note 15, at 1214; James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, IndividualLiberty, andPersonalIdentity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1, 13.
17.
Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 891-905.
18.
See generally Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1982) (reviewing the rules governing the three types of
servitudes).
19.
See the introductory note for a list of my previous scholarship.
20.
1 borrow this useful terminology from Julia Mahoney. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
21.
Carol Rose offers a similar but not identical categorization identifying the concerns as
involving information or notice, renegotiability, and value (including third party effects). Rose,
supranote 12, at 298-305.
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B. Notice and Information Costs
Servitudes, like other remote-control property rights, raise special
concerns about notice and information costs. Consider the counterfactual: if the person in possession of land necessarily had all rights to
control its use, then it would be easy for someone else acquiring possession from that person to understand exactly what they were getting. 22
Where, by contrast, the law recognizes servitudes that allow one person
to own and possess the land while someone else has the right to control
its use, the newcomer who acquires possession does not automatically
know what use rights he has acquired. If servitudes could be imposed to
benefit strangers without any doctrines promoting or requiring notice to
people acquiring the burdened land, then transfers of possession would
be plagued by confusion and/or costly investigation to discover hidden
encumbrances. In Keppell v. Bailey,23 one of the seminal nineteenth cen
24
tury English servitude cases, Lord Brougham famously expressed his
concern about this possibility.
[G]reat detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties
were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real
property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar
character, which should follow them into all hands, however remote.
Every close, every messuage, might thus be held in a several fashion;
and it would hardly be possible to know what rights the acquisition
25
of any parcel conferred, or what obligations it imposed.
This kind of hostility toward the rude surprise of remote-control
property runs throughout the law and scholarship on servitudes. Courts
and commentators agree that servitudes should not generally bind purchasers who acquire land with no notice of the encumbrance and no reasonable opportunity to acquire notice.
The importance of notice is, accordingly, often identified as a ra26
tionale for the common law's limitations on servitudes. For example,
the "touch and concern" doctrine requires that servitudes have some connection to the land that they burden, and, typically, to a neighboring benefited parcel. The doctrine thus helps to ensure that servitudes will be
relatively easy to discover upon physical inspection, and that the owner

22.
See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 384-85 (describing "the rule of
possession" and observing that "[t]he advantages of this system are obvious. It is easy to understand,
cheap to administer, and generally unambiguous").

23.

Keppell v. Bailey (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042.

24.
See Rose, supra note 12, at 298 & n.7 (citing Keppell as an example of "nineteenth century judges sharply criticiz[ing servitudes] for stirring confusion about and tying up real estate").
25.
Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049. Keppell was superseded to some extent by the landmark

case of Tulk v. Moxhay discussed below. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143.
26.

See, e.g., French,supra note 15, at 1283-86; see also Rose, supra note 12, at 299.
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of the beneficial interest will be relatively easy to identify and locate.27
By limiting the subject matter of servitudes, the doctrine also shapes and
reinforces expectations in a way that limits surprise. 28 In their influential
work explaining the role of property standardization in limiting information costs, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith point to the touch and
concern requirement as an example of a doctrinal technique that standardizes servitudes and limits the information costs they impose. 29
Other doctrines that emerged from the seminal nineteenth century
English servitudes case law, including the requirements of appurtenance
and horizontal privity, similarly limited servitudes to those that were
relatively easy to discover. 30 When the landmark decision of Tulk v.
Moxhay eliminated the horizontal privity requirement for equitable
servitudes, it did so only in cases in which there was actual notice. 32
Recording acts, which provide for public recording of interests in
land and protect bona fide purchasers from some unrecorded encumbrances, represent another notice-facilitating mechanism.33 There was no
comprehensive recording system in England when the seminal nineteenth
century servitude cases were decided.34 There were, however, recording
systems in every U.S. state.35 One might, therefore, have expected courts
in the United States to take a more accommodating and less convoluted
approach to servitudes. To the contrary, they initially adopted the English
categories and many of the corresponding doctrinal limitations. Most of
the limitations made their way into the first Restatement of Property3 6 in
1944 and subsequent case law, despite fierce opposition by those who
saw them as anachronistic solutions to a notice problem that no longer
existed in the United States, if it ever did.37
Criticism of the law's complexity and needless hostility toward certain types of servitudes persisted. Over the course of the twentieth centu27.
See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 402 ("Servitudes that meet this
[touch and concern] requirement are much easier to verify by physical inspection of the property and
its surroundings . . . .").
28.
See generally French, supra note 18, at 1290.
29.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of Property:

The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (2000).
30.

See generally Rose, supra note 12, at 299-301; Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 893-95.

31.

(1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 775.

32.
Id. at 1144 ("[T]he question is ... whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a
manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased.").

33.
See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Land Recording and Copyright Reform, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1497, 1502-03 (2013).
34.

JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 888 (8th ed. 2014).

35.

Id.

36.
RESTATEMENT OF PROP. (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
37.
Regarding horizontal privity, see CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND
OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 117 (2d ed. 1947). See also Lawrence Berger, A

Policy Analysis of PromisesRespecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 193-95 (1970). On
the persistence of limitations in U.S. servitude law "notwithstanding persistent criticism from the
academic community," see Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 16-17.
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ry, courts in the United States gradually relaxed some of the most controversial limitations. 38 This evolution was reflected, and perhaps outpaced, by the 2000 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, which
abandoned the horizontal privity requirement, "touch and concern," and
all limitations on benefits held in gross.39 Restatement Reporter Susan
French explained in advance of the project that alternative mechanisms
for providing notice justified eliminating unnecessary rules: "Servitudes
law may be simplified substantially because particular rules designed to
give notice are no longer needed. The modern technology of record systems and title search procedures, together with the protection recording
acts afford, have made these rules superfluous."
This evolution of servitude doctrine demonstrates, first, that remotecontrol property comes with special notice and information costs; and,
second, that those costs can be addressed with a number of different
mechanisms. Subject matter limitations like touch and concern are one
mechanism, actual notice requirements as in Tulk are another, and recording systems are a third. As we will see when we turn to personal
property, the comparative availability of these mechanisms differs across
the types of resources that might be burdened by remote-control property
rights, and so does the intensity of concerns about notice and information
cost problems.
C. The Problem of the Future
Assuring adequate and meaningful notice and minimizing information costs are not the only justifications for standardizing property
rights and restricting servitudes. There is another constellation of concerns for which I have borrowed Julia Mahoney's useful term: "the problem of the future."41 Within this constellation, I include a number of related issues regarding the extent to which enforcement of servitudes undesirably limits the freedom of future generations to manage resources

38.
See Rose, supra note 12, at 301; Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 906, 908.
39.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.4, 2.6, 3.2, ch. 2, intro. note, ch. 3,
intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
40.
French, supra note 15, at 1225; see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of

Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358 (1982) ("[Wlith notice secured by

&

recordation, freedom of contract should control."); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 407
("[T]he registries developed for verifying ownership of land . .. [avoid] many of the additional
system and nonuser costs that effective verification of these rights would otherwise require."); Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 40 ("[R]ecording acts . . . lower[] the costs of notice [and are] an
alternative method of lowering information costs."). On recording acts generally, see RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01 (2005) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender

Co., Inc. 2015). On marketable title acts, see id.
41.

§ 82.04.

Mahoney, supra note 20; see also Susan F. French, PerpetualTrusts, Conservation Servi-

tudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2523 (2006); cf Merrill & Smith,
supra note 29, at 4-7 (surveying the literature and observing that "[t]he primary candidate for an
economic explanation [of the numerus clausus principle] has been the suggestion that the numerus
clausus is a device for minimizing the effects of durable property interests on those dealing with
assets in the future").
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wisely and autonomously.42 The theme is excessive control by one generation over the freedom and flexibility of the next. The specific concerns are that excessive control will limit autonomy and recreate feudal
incidents, impose inefficient land-use choices, and threaten freedom of
alienation. These problems arise not only from manipulation of property
rights by an earlier generation but also from the transaction costs that
make that manipulation difficult to undo. In her classification of concerns about servitudes, Carol Rose groups many of the same problems
under the heading "renegotiability.A 3
One feature of servitudes that contributes to these concerns about
the future is the aforementioned remoteness between burdened and benefited parties who may be complete strangers, a remoteness that can contribute to the difficulty of renegotiating an obsolete servitude. Another
important servitude feature that underlies the problem of the future is
durability. Unlike a living party to a contract, a parcel of land that carries
its terms with it can interact with generations of people over time, increasing the likelihood that unforeseen circumstances will render those
terms obsolete." The problem of the future is further compounded when
a servitude arises in a context of rapid and unpredictable change, making
unforeseen obsolescence especially likely.45
Concerns about the problem of the future resonate with the larger
jurisprudence and literature on dead-hand control- in the law of property.
A classic statement on dead-hand control comes from Lewis Simes, who
argued in his lectures on Public Policy and the Dead Hand that "[i]t is
socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living
members and not by the dead."" Simes went on to quote Thomas Jefferson, who insisted in a letter to James Madison that "[t]he earth belongs
always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct." 47

This preference for the living over the dead is often justified in
terms of autonomy and contrasted with feudal serfdom.4 According to
42.
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 112-19 (1993) (discussing
ways in which restraints on alienation and servitudes may "enhance[] or inhibit[] freedom or personhood systematically and over time").
43.
Rose, supra note 12, at 301-03.
44.
See Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956,

958-59 (1988); see also Glen 0. Robinson, PersonalPropertyServitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449,
1489 (2004) ("A restriction on the use (or sale) of Blackacre can limit the use of a valuable resource
for a very long time.").
45.
Cf Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion ofPerpetuity and the PreservationofPrivately Owned

Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 573, 583-84 (2004).
46.

LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955).

47.

Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in

WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)).
48.
As Uriel Reichman puts it in his discussion of servitudes, "Private property is sanctioned
by society not only to promote efficiency, but also to safeguard individual freedom. Servitudes are a
kind of private legislation affecting a line of future owners. Limiting such 'legislative powers' . . . eliminates the possibility of creating modem variations of feudal serfdom." Reichman, supra
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this view, controlling people who are distant in time and space-not family members or contractual privies-is a power associated with government or with undesirable feudal hierarchy. Such control should not be
unilaterally imposed by private parties merely on the basis of their property ownership and informed only by their "whim and caprice." 4 9
The concern with dead-hand control is also often discussed in utilitarian terms: the land-use choices of previous generations may turn out to
be inefficient ones in light of changed circumstances.50 The mechanism
by which dead-hand control limits autonomy or efficiency requires further explanation where voluntary termination of servitudes is allowed by
law-as it typically, but not always, is.51 The potential problem is that
transaction costs may block a negotiated solution, even when all affected
parties would, in theory, agree to extinguish the unwanted servitude. The
current holders of the servitude's beneficial interest may be difficult to
identify and locate, and they may be so numerous as to make contact and.
negotiation infeasible. Defenders of limitations on servitudes often point
to this specter of transaction-cost-insulated servitudes as a justification
for policies that either constrain the subject matter of servitudes or enable
judges to terminate the detrimental ones. 52
Inefficient but transaction-cost-insulated servitudes represent a species of the anti-commons problem described by Michael Heller with regard to fragmentation of property interests more generally. Servitudes
divide rights in a single parcel of land among multiple owners. If it is
later desirable to consolidate those rights in order to put the resource to.
its best use, fragmentation of the property bundle, and the transaction
costs involved in re-bundling, can make consolidation difficult. Heller
cites restrictions on servitudes among "numerous restraints [that] limit an
individual's capacity to break up property bundles too much."54

note 15, at 1233. For a skeptical view, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1258 (1985). See also Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law ofServitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 890-92 (1988).

49.

Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1982).

50.
Mahoney, supra note 20, at 744; see also Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation
Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 433, 457 (1984) ("The market response of a future property owner to the future needs of society is likely to be more effective than a past owner's fixed blueprint.").
51.
In some states, statutes make it difficult to terminate a conservation easement even if the
easement holder agrees. But usually conservation easements, like other types of servitudes, can be
voluntarily extinguished by negotiation with the holder of the non-possessory interest. See generally
ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 195-

96 (2005).
52.
53.

See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 15, at 1233.
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom

Marx to Markets, I11 HARV. L. REv. 621, 660-67 (1998).
54.
Id. at 664. See generally Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of
PropertyRights: A FunctionalInterpretationof the Law of Servitudes, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS

1, 18-23 (2003); Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 626-29 (2002).
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Heller's concern with fragmentation offers an interesting way to
think about the classic but under-theorized concern with restraints on
alienation, which is also often cited as a rationale for limiting servitudes.55 Many legal mechanisms that are criticized for restraining alienation do not, in fact, directly restrain transfer. They merely limit the rights
that can be acquired from any single owner. So a subsequent user who
wants to reassemble property rights into a useful bundle must tackle the
transaction costs involved in multiple negotiations. Often the problem is
not so much restraint on alienation as restraint on acquisition: every individual stick in the property can be sold; the difficulty is in buying a bundle that is useful to own.
These various concerns associated with the problem of the future
have long motivated common-law restrictions on servitudes. 56 And contemporary property theorists point to them to justify a variety of doctrines that serve to standardize and consolidate property rights.57
As with the problem of notice, however, multiple mechanisms could
be employed to address the problem of the future. The view adopted by
the current Restatement is that concerns with the future are best addressed in the future by marketable title acts and by doctrines that allow
judicial modification or termination of obsolete servitudes instead of
through doctrines that limit servitude subject matter ex ante." The Restatement uses the availability of these alternative approaches to justify
discarding the common law rules, like touch and concern, that addressed
the problem of the future indirectly.59
Although the mechanisms used to address the issue have shifted
over time, it is clear that the problem of the future is a recurring justification for servitude skepticism. As with the problems of notice and information costs, it is a problem that is endemic to durable remote-control
property rights but one that can be alleviated using a variety of doctrinal
techniques.
D. Externalities
A final set of problems often associated with servitudes involves
their impact on third parties. Restrictions that run with land can impose

55.
On the role of restraints on alienation as a rationale for the law's general tendency to
standardize property rights, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 24. Merrill and Smith also note
the connection to fragmentation, arguing that the theory that the numerus clausus is "a doctrine
designed to prevent undue restraints on alienation ... implicitly rests on concern about fragmentation." Id. at 52.
56.
See generally Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 904.
57.
See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 15, at 1232-33.
58.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 3, intro. note (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
59.

See id
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significant and harmful externalities. 0 Both the problem of the future
and the problem of notice can be understood, at least in part, as externality problems. Inadequate or costly information about the nature of property rights in a specific parcel of land can produce confusion about property rights more generally. When one landowner's parcel is burdened by a
strange and confusing covenant, the rest of the neighborhood's residents
may become concerned and confused about the nature of their own
rights. They bear an information-cost externality, to use Merrill and
Smith's terminology.6 1 Similarly, the costs imposed by servitudes that
will burden future generations in unpredictable ways may not be accounted for in today's land transactions.
There are additional categories of externalities that have generated
servitude skepticism. A servitude that prohibits land from being used in a
way that subjects a neighboring business to competition, for example,
may harm third-party competitors and consumers.62 A racially-restrictive..
covenant may harm third parties who suffer its discriminatory impact.63
The third-party effects of servitudes are likely to be especially pronounced-compared, for example, to the third-party effects of bilateral
contracts imposing similar restrictions-because of the features of remoteness and durability. Servitudes can reach out over time and space in
a way that tends, in general, to expand their impact and to intensify the
externality problem.6 4
In addition to its other functions, the touch and concern requirement
has sometimes seemed like a catch-all, doctrinal hook used by courts to
weed out servitudes that impose harmful externalities. 65 The Restatement
opts to address such harms more directly, by invalidating those servitudes that "violate public policy" because, for example, they are "arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious," or "unreasonably burden[] a fundamental

60.
See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 617 (1985).
61.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 8-9 ("The existence of unusual property rights increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs
fully into account, making them a true externality.").
62.
See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 60, at 622; cf Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass.
1885) (using the touch and concern doctrine to invalidate running covenant against competition),

overruled by Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243, 246-49 (Mass. 1979). See generally Susan F. French, Can Covenants Not to Sue, Covenants Against Competition and Spite Covenants Run with Land? ComparingResults Under the Touch or Concern Doctrine and the Restate-

ment Third, Property (Servitudes), 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 267, 280-90 (2003) (reviewing
two cases concerning whether covenants against competition run with the land).

63.

E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).

64.
Contracts that happen to affect many third parties might trigger the same level of concern.
Cf Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions,73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 917 (1988); Merrill
& Smith, supra note 29, at 57.
65.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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constitutional right," or "impose[] an unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition."66
As we will see, the externality problem is one that features prominently in the analysis of whether, and how the law of servitudes, and its
limiting doctrines, should be applied outside of the land context.
E. PersonalProperty Servitudes
The gradual erosion of traditional limitations on land servitudes can
be explained in part by the development of alternative methods for ensuring notice, by the adoption of ex-post solutions to the problem of the
future, and by the replacement of vague requirements like touch and concern with more focused doctrines addressing specific types of harmful
externalities caused by certain types of servitudes. During the course of
this evolution, property owners, commentators, and occasionally courts
have raised the question whether property doctrines that increasingly
accommodated land servitudes could also be applied to enforce running
restrictions attached to items of personal property.

&

English equity courts initially extended the equitable servitude reasoning of Tulk to personal property, holding in De Mattos v. Gibson,67 in
1859, that the principle applied "alike . . . to movable and immovable
property."68 But in the early twentieth century, English courts stepped
back from this position, holding instead, in Taddy & Co. v. Sterious
Co., that a manufacturer's resale conditions attached to product packages
"do not run with goods, and cannot be imposed upon them. Subsequent
purchasers, therefore, do not take subject to any conditions which the
Court can enforce." 69
In several early twentieth century cases, U.S. courts similarly refused to enforce running restrictions that imposed resale conditions on
chattels. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman70 involved a manufacturer
of unpatented medicine who attempted to fix retail prices by only selling
to wholesalers who agreed to sell only to approved retailers who had
agreed to the manufacturer's minimum prices. The defendant, a retailer
66.
67.

Id.
(1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 108.

68.
Id. at 110; see also SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 259; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 953-54 (1928); Andrew Tettenborn, Covenants,
Privity ofContract, and the PurchaserofPersonalProperty,41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 58, 58-59 (1982).

69.
[1904] 1 Ch 354 at 358 (Eng). In a subsequent case, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams
declared Taddy "perfectly right." McGruther v. Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306, 309 (Eng.). Lord Justice
Romer elaborated that
A vendor cannot ... by printing the so-called condition upon some part of the goods or
on the case containing them, say that every subsequent purchaser of the goods is bound to
comply with the condition, so that if he does not comply with the condition he can be
sued by the original vendor. That is clearly wrong. You cannot in that way make conditions run with goods.

Id. at 311.
70.
153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
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who was not on the manufacturer's approved list, nonetheless managed
to acquire a supply of the medicine, which it sold for less than the minimum price despite having knowledge of the minimum price regime.71
The manufacturer apparently cited De Mattos "to support the notion that
a covenant may attach to chattels which pass by delivery from hand to
hand and bring any one who buys with notice under the restrictions
against a resale at less than a dictated price." 72 Judge-later JusticeLurton rejected that proposition instead citing contrary cases, including
Taddy, and declared sweepingly that:
It is . . . a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting
the use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to
follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice. A covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run
73
with or attach to a mere chattel.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 74 the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the enforceability of a similar price-fixing
scheme, explaining that "[t]he basis of the argument appears to be that,
as the manufacturer may make and sell, or not, as he chooses, he may
affix conditions as to the use of the article or as to the prices at which
purchasers may dispose of it." 75 Like its predecessors, the Court rejected
this chattel servitude logic: "Whatever right the manufacturer may have
to project his control beyond his own sales must depend not upon an
inherent power incident to production and original ownership, but upon
agreement." 7 6

These and similar cases are the bases for the conventional wisdom
among academic commentators that chattel servitudes, while not unheard
of, are much less likely to be enforced than land servitudes.77 Commentators are less uniform in their assessment of whether, and if so why, this
should be the case.
Contemporary scholarship about personal property servitudes owes
a debt to two foundational articles by Zechariah Chafee.7 ' In 1928,
Chafee provided a comprehensive analysis of the topic in Equitable Ser-

71.
72.
73.
74.
U.S. 877
75.
76.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39.
220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
(2007).
Id. at 404.
Id at 405.

77.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 407 (noting that the law "makes it much simpler to establish partial rights in real property than in personal property"); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 29, at 18 ("[A]lthough the case law is rather thin, it... appears that one cannot create servitudes in personal property.").
78.
See Chaffee, supra note 68; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956).
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vitudes on Chattels.79 The article surveys the case law, based on which
Chafee observed that "[i]n view of these decisions it might well be maintained that the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels has been effectively killed by the courts . . . ."80 But Chafee found the courts' reasoning
conclusory and unpersuasive. 8 i Further, he observed that most of the
cases involved restrictions that restrained trade in one way or another by,
for example, fixing prices, tying goods, or dividing territories-leaving
open the question of the validity of restrictions not subject to that objection. 82 In the meantime, manufactures continued to attempt to impose
restrictions, suggesting a live question.83 So Chafee went on to consider
and evaluate normative arguments in favor and against enforcing chattel
servitudes. 84

I will describe some of Chafee's specific arguments below. For
now, suffice it to say that he found servitudes attached to personal property more likely to be costly and less likely to be necessary than land
servitudes.85 Although he was unwilling to condemn chattel servitudes
across the board, he put the burden on anyone seeking to enforce a running restriction on a chattel to show that theirs was a special case in
which the benefits outweighed the costs, or that something in the business or legal environment had changed so dramatically as to make chattel
servitudes desirable in general. 86 Chafee did not think that the time for
enforceable chattel servitudes had come, as a general matter, in 1928, nor
when he revisited the question in 1956.87
Some contemporary commentators argue that the time for chattel
servitudes has now come. Referring to Chafee's 1928 article and his
1956 second thoughts, Glen Robinson argues in his 2004 article Personal
Property Servitudes that: "Nearly a half century later, there is reason to
entertain third thoughts on the matter despite the general disposition of

79.

Chafee, supra note 68.

80.

Id. at 955.

81.
For example, as to the oft-recited policy in favor of free alienation, Chafee observed that
restraints on the alienation of land "were also regarded as objectionable at common law" and yet
cases like Tulk v. Moxhay enforced use restrictions that made land less alienable as a practical matter. Id. at 982-83. So "[]ust as modem needs have brought equitable restrictions on land, of which
the old common law knew nothing, into existence, they may also call for a limited departure from
the free transfer of chattels for the sake of promoting desirable business practices wholly strange to

Coke's day." Id.
82.
Id. at 1007 ("In many situations where manufacturers have endeavored to employ this
device, the courts have refused to allow them to do so because it would unreasonably restrain trade.
However, it seems possible that restrictions on the area and the form of resale may not always be
open to such an objection.").
83.
Id. at 956 ("[T]he wide prevalence of these restrictions in business practice indicates that
they embody a strong and definite commercial policy which, despite its previous checkered career,
may eventually succeed in obtaining judicial recognition, perhaps with legislative aid.").

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 960-1013.
Id. at 1011-13.
Id. at 1013.
Chafee, supra note 78, at 1263-64.

2016]

THE LIMTS OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY

967

courts and commentators to be content with Chafee's judgment."" Robinson suggests that personal property servitudes should be enforceable as
a general matter, with any concerns about restrictions featuring anticompetitive terms left to be addressed by antitrust law, now more mature
than it was when the early twentieth century chattel servitude cases were
decided.89
In 2007, I took up the question myself, arguing-contra Robinsonthat judicial skepticism is justified by a somewhat different mix of the
concerns with notice and information costs, dead-hand control over the
future, and externalities that motivated skepticism of land servitudes.9
This renewed interest in chattel servitudes is due in part to the historical, doctrinal, and theoretical connections with current controversies
about the scope of IP exhaustion, as the next section explains.

II. SERVITUDES AND THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY EXHAUSTION

In the midst of early twentieth century cases questioning the enforceability of chattel servitudes as a general matter, several cases arose
that posed an added complication: the chattels in question embodied
copyrighted works or patented inventions. Against the backdrop of courts
refusing to enforce servitudes on ordinary chattels, IP owners argued that
their exclusive rights should give them extra power to control downstream resale and use of the embodiments of their intangible property.
The seminal case taking up this question in the copyright context
was Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,91 in which a book publisher attempted
to enforce this restriction printed inside books: "The price of this book at
retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a
92
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright."
The Second Circuit understood this as an "attempt of an owner of
an ordinary chattel to impose by contract restrictions upon its use or sale
binding upon third parties, and which, it is claimed, may operate as a sort
of ambulatory covenant annexed to the chattel." 93 The court rejected that
attempt, albeit rather timidly in light of the conflicting case law it cited
on the topic, including both De Mattos and Taddy & Co.94
But the plaintiff in Bobbs-Merrill did not rely exclusively on the
equitable servitude notion from De Mattos. It also argued that, as the
88.
89.

Robinson, supra note 44, at 1451.
Id. at 1494-1515.

90.

Van Houweling, supranote 14, at 949.

91.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (Bobbs-Merrill 1), 147 F. 15 (2d Cir. 1906), affd, 210 U.S.
339 (1908).
92.
Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 24.
94.
Id. at 25-28.
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copyright holder, it had an exclusive right to "vend" the copyrighted
work embodied in its books.95 By distributing books subject to restrictive
terms, it was granting purchasers only a conditional license to exercise
that vending right; vending outside the terms of that license-that is,
selling books for less than one dollar-therefore amounted to copyright
infringement.9 6 The Copyright Act, according to this logic, provides a
mechanism for imposing running restrictions on chattels that the common law lacks. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed.97
On this point, both Bobbs-Merrill opinions purport merely to interpret the language of the Copyright Act, concluding that the right to vend
granted in the Act is exhausted as to a given copy of a copyrighted work
once that copy is sold.98 But the reasonableness of that interpretation
gains strength from the notion that to interpret the right to vend beyond
the first sale would do violence to the common law.9 For example, the
Supreme Court's opinion notes with apparent alarm:
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell
the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reservation of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infringer because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the notice.ioo

&

The Court refused to interpret the Copyright Act to include such a
0
right.o'
Although-unlike the Second Circuit-it did not cite Taddy
Co. or any other cases addressing chattel servitudes, the Court's narrow
interpretation of the vending right suggests an undercurrent of hostility
toward running restrictions on chattels that made it difficult to persuade
the Court that Congress intended to part ways with the common law.' 02
Of course, the statutory rights granted to copyright holders supersede the hostility to running restrictions to some extent: there are some
95.
96.
97.

Id at 17.
Id
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (Bobbs-Merrill l), 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908).

98.
See id. at 350 ("It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it."); Bobbs-Merrill 1, 147 F. at 22 ("Ifthe
statutory owner desires after publication to control the lawfully published copies, such control can
only be secured by means of positive contract or conditions . . . .").

99.

Cf Bobbs-Merrill 1, 147 F. at 20 ("The law of copyright also gives privileges to authors

and publishers that do not pertain to property which anybody may make and sell if he can; but even
under the law of copyright, when the owner of a copyright and of a particular copy of a book to
which it pertains, has parted with all his title to the book, and has conferred an absolute title to it
upon a purchaser, he cannot restrict the right of alienation, which is one of the incidents of owner-

ship in personal property." (quoting Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co., 61 N.E. 219, 220 (Mass. 1901)));
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1248-49 (2001).

100.

Bobbs-MerrillII, 210 U.S. at 351.

101.
See id
102.
See id See generally Robinson, supra note 44, at 1464-81 (describing links between the
first sale doctrine and common law principles).
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things that the owner of a copyright-embodying chattel is not permitted
to do with it-for example, reproduce each of its pages-on account of
the non-possessory intellectual property rights created by copyright. But
Bobbs-Merrill and, later, the statutory codification of the "first sale" doctrine,1 03 articulates one limit on even a copyright holder's power to impose running restrictions on personal property.
In the patent context, the Supreme Court initially accepted the idea
that a patent owner's right to control "use" of a chattel embodying his
invention could be leveraged into the type of running restriction that
would not be enforced on a non-patented article. In Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co.,'0o the Court held that a patent owner could use an express, conditional license to impose a running restriction on a chattel embodying a
patented invention against a purchaser with notice;'05 specifically, the
Court enforced a restriction stamped on a mimeograph machine that said:
"This machine is sold by the A.B. Dick Company, with the license restriction that it may be used only with the stencil, paper, ink, and other
supplies made by A.B. Dick Company."'0
Justice Lurton, who had rejected the notion of a use restriction "annexed to a chattel" in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman,i0 7 explained that
the patent law, unlike the common law of personal property' 0 and unlike
copyright, separates ownership of a chattel from the right to use that
chattel, and that the right to use can be granted conditionally so as to
allow use subject to running restrictions. 109 The opinion suggested that
other restrictions, even resale price-fixing restrictions of the type rejected
in Dr. Miles and Bobbs-Merrill, could be enforced via an express restriction imposed by a patent holder against a chattel owner with notice."i 0 Indeed, Justice Lurton cited an English case,"' Incandescent Gas
Light Co. v. Cantelo,1 12 which held that a patentee's restrictive terms
were enforceable with notice and that "[i]t does not matter how unreasonable or how absurd the conditions are."ll3
But the distinction that Justice Lurton drew between common law
chattel servitudes and running restrictions imposed via patent law on the
use of chattels embodying patented inventions was short-lived. One year
later, the Court refused to enforce express retail price limitations printed
103.
104.
Mfg. Co.,
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 25-26.
153 F. 24 (1907).
A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 18-19.
Id. at 44-45.
See id. at 26.
Id. at 40.
(1895) 12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 262 (QB) (UK).
Id. at 264.
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on packaging for patented medicine in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.114 The
Court confirmed the Bauer result in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine
Co."1

5

refusing to enforce price restrictions attached to patented record

players.

In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufactur-

ing Co.," 7 the Court expressly overruled A.B. Dick, refusing to enforce a

18
trying restriction imposed via a label on a movie projector."

My claim here is not that these seminal cases establishing the doctrines of copyright and patent exhaustion were mere application of a
common law prohibition on chattel servitudes. They were primarily exercises in statutory interpretation, determining the meaning of the exclusive rights to vend copies of copyrighted works and to use and sell articles embodying patented inventions. But these exercises in statutory interpretation were conducted in the shadow of the common law hostility
to chattel servitudes, which made the question of statutory interpretation
partly whether Congress had spoken clearly enough to invade what
would otherwise be the province of the common law and to validate a
legal mechanism that the common law had rejected."19
III. CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES

The contemporary commentary on personal property servitudes has
been motivated in part by controversies about the scope of IP exhaustion,
with its historical and doctrinal connection to the servitude case law.
Among the most pressing questions is whether exhaustion is a default
rule that IP owners can avoid merely by attaching restrictive labels to
objects embodying their IP, or by characterizing distribution of those
objects as "licenses" rather than sales.1 20 The commentators who address
this and related questions come to dramatically different conclusions
about the implications of the chattel-servitude connection.121

114.
229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
115.
243 U.S. 490 (1917).
116.
Id. at 501 (concluding that the case fell "within the principles of" Bauer, 229 U.S. at 16,
and Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873)).
117.
243 U.S. 502 (1917).
118.
Id. at 518-19; see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., No. 89 C 4524, 1990 WL
19535, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1990), rev'd, 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
119.
See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the
common law . .. are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."); cf Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1353 (2013) ("'[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law,' it is presumed that 'Congress intended to retain the substance of

the common law."' (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 329 n.13 (2010))).
120. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (holding that patent exhaustion is defeated by a clearly communicated single use/no-resale
restriction); id. at 778 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . admits of no exception.").
121.
See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, Glen Robinson finds arguments against enforcement of chattel servitudes unpersuasive.122 He contends that the doctrinal
prohibition should be abandoned and that chattel servitudes should be
enforced much as land servitudes are.123 Because Robinson sees IP exhaustion as sharing the same origins and logic as the ban on chattel servitudes, he suggests that exhaustion should not operate to invalidate IPowner-imposed restrictions on use and resale, which should generally be
enforceable with both IP and state law remedies.1 24
In their work on copyright exhaustion, Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz also emphasize the common law origins of the IP exhaustion
concept, but their origin story is somewhat different.1 25 They point not
only to the common law's general hostility to chattel servitudes1 26 but
also to common law reasoning within copyright itself: cases preceding
the seminal chattel-servitude decisions in which judges permitted downstream owners of copyrighted works to do a variety of things without the
authority of copyright owners.127 They argue that the justifications motivating this common law reasoning should continue to shape the law of
copyright exhaustion in the courts, even beyond the codification of copyright first sale as a specific limitation on the rights of distribution and
display.1 28 In addition, Perzanowski and Schultz harness the common law
rationales for exhaustion to resist attempts by copyright owners to avoid
exhaustion by re-characterizing sales as licenses.1 2 9 Beyond that, they
argue that the user privileges associated with exhaustion should sometimes extend beyond owners of tangible copies in a digital age in which
such copies are increasingly irrelevant.1 30
In a recent contribution to this debate, John Duffy and Richard
Hynes make a break with those who trace the origins of exhaustion to the
common law of either chattel servitudes or IP.13' They argue instead that
the doctrine is exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation.132 Its only
connection to the law of chattel servitudes is as a "boundary doctrine"
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123.

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See generally Robinson, supra note 44.

124. See id at 1505 (approving of the result in Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 1086, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2000), which held that the doctrine of first sale did not apply to a
software licensing agreement that granted end users with a right to use the software but did not
transfer title).
125.
See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, DigitalExhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV.

889 (2011).
126.
Id. at 910-11.
127.
See id at 910-12.
128.
Id. at 912-18.
129.
Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and PersonalProperty, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1221-22 (2015).
130.
Id. at 1256 ("Copy ownership, as currently construed by courts in software cases, is no
longer a useful benchmark for identifying the relationship between the consumer and the work that
triggers exhaustion.").
131.
Duffy & Hynes, supra note 1, at 36.

132.
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that prevents IP law from interfering more than Congress intended with
generally applicable commercial law.1 33 As to the substance of that
commercial law, Duffy and Hynes point out that distributors of chattels,
including chattels embodying IP, can in fact impose running restrictions
by complying with the Uniform Commercial Code's rules governing
secured transactions.' 34 They argue that IP owners should also be able to
seek contractual, but not IP, remedies against users who violate terms
attached to IP embodiments.'13 This is not to say, however, that exhaustion lacks teeth. Duffy and Hynes point out that the notice and other formal requirements of these bodies of state law are more onerous, and the
remedies less generous, than those of IP.' 36
My own view is that the information costs, problems of the future,
and externalities that long motivated doctrinal restrictions on land servitudes are all the more relevant to both chattel servitudes and IP. Consider
notice and information costs, including the costs involved in identifying
and locating servitude beneficiaries for the purposes of renegotiating. 37
Notice and information costs are minimized for land servitudes by recording systems, but no comprehensive recording system exists for chattels outside of the secured transactions context. And recording of IP is
notoriously imperfect. When IP owners are permitted to impose running
restrictions notwithstanding exhaustion, the ultimate recipient of the burdened object may be remote in time and place, with little hope of identifying and communicating with the current owner of the IP right for purposes of renegotiating the restriction once it becomes obsolete. This is, of
course, a problem that plagues remote-control IP rights generally, including the core rights of reproducing copies of copyrighted works and making patented inventions. But at least with regard to the generally inexhaustible rights of reproduction and making, there is a strong case that
the benefits gained by the remote-control property rights outweigh the
costs imposed, as where land servitudes are enforced to serve important
land-use planning goals. That is the basic logic of IP protection: the incentive effect relies on IP owners controlling the proliferation of embodiments that might compete in the marketplace with their authorized embodiments.'3 That type of control limits the ruinous competition that
could make it impossible for at least some creators and inventors to garner returns on their investments. It is much less clear that adequate incen133.
134.
135.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 60-64.
Id. at 8-9, 58-60.
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Id. at 58-64 (discussing contract remedies and security interest notice requirements).
137.
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Technology and Tracing Costs: Lessons from Real Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 385 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,
2013). Guy Rub also emphasizes these costs in his recent work on copyright exhaustion. Guy A.

Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 788-89 (2015).
138.
Cf Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 125, at 915 ("Of course, title to a copy cannot
confer on its owner an unbounded privilege to reproduce the work. Complete exhaustion of the
reproduction right would undermine the incentive structure at the heart of copyright law.").
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tives depend on IP owners' ability to control downstream use and transfer of authorized embodiments.13 9
Furthermore, remote-control IP prompts concerns apart from those
related to notice and information costs. There is a special version of the
problem of the future that looms large here. The health of the intellectual
property system relies on a rich public domain, which depends in part on
the expiration of IP rights after "limited times." But the public domain
will not fuel future creativity and innovation if the works destined for the
public domain do not survive the period of exclusive rights. If TP owners
could exercise continued remote control over all manifestations of their
works and inventions, that control could curtail the ability of others to
preserve those works for future generations.
Perhaps most importantly, access to, preservation of, and autonomous enjoyment of works of IP generate spillover benefits for third parties. If exhaustion could easily be evaded by private ordering, it would
effectively impose negative externalities on those beneficiaries of the IP
system.
So, to me, the argument for exhaustion stems in part from the costs
that are imposed by chattel servitudes generally, in part from costs specific to the IP context, and in part from the lack of justification for enduring those costs, except in the limited circumstances in which creators'
and inventors' incentives would be undermined in a way that inhibits
progress in science and the useful arts."4 The proper reach of the exhaustion doctrine is thus a question for IP policy-in Congress and the
courts-not for IP owners unilaterally deciding that exhaustion should
not apply to them, either by unilaterally placing post-sale conditions, recharacterizing sales as licenses, or imposing nominally contractual restrictions that are so adhesive and ubiquitous that they function like
property rights. 14 Exhaustion should be subject to relaxation only if information costs problems are addressed.1 42 Even then, there should be a
screen, akin to the touch and concern requirement, 143 that would help
139.

See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013) ("[T]he Constitu-

tion's language nowhere suggests that its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide
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nomics of Post-SaleRestraints, 2014 BYU L. REv. 55, 57-60.
140.
Cf Katz, supra note 139, at 99-100 ("[T]he marginal benefit from having enforceable
restraints diminishes as we move along the vectors of distance and time. At the same time, the marginal social costs associated with goods encumbered by restraints could easily increase over distance
and time because any use inconsistent with the restraint would require the IP owners' permission, yet
the cost of obtaining such permission could easily increase over time and distance.").
141.
See generally Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 934-35. But see Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v.

Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that clearly communicated postsale restrictions may be enforced under patent law).
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See generally Van Houweling, supra note 137.
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See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property
Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1063,

1079-80 (2011).
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ensure that running restrictions on objects embodying IP promote progress rather than imposing negative externalities. These negative externalities could include waste of physical resources, destruction of cultural
heritage, and diminution of opportunities for innovation and expression.'" If running restrictions promote progress, but only in the short
term, or only when enforced against intermediaries but not end-users,
then they should be subject to durational limits or a changed circumstances doctrine designed to address the problem of the future.1 45
CONCLUSION

IP exhaustion should be understood against the backdrop of a long
history of skepticism toward what I call remote-control property rights.
Where IP owners try to exercise remote control over uses and transfers
that do not cut to the core of their need to limit ruinous competition, exhaustion can step in to maintain IP's balance between remote-control
property's benefits and costs. These costs and benefits are not just a matter of concern to IP owners and users: like the costs associated with personal property servitudes, they have implications for a property system
that is beset by high information costs, for future generations burdened
by obsolete restrictions, and for third parties harmed by other externalities.
Although looking to the law of tangible property helps us to recognize these costs, we should also keep in mind their unique character in
the IP context. Restrictions on the use of works of creativity and invention have implications for the promotion of progress of science and the
useful arts. Therefore, they should not be ratcheted up solely at the whim
of IP owners attaching labels to embodiments of their works. Nor should
they be left solely to generally applicable commercial law without regard
to IP's special policy concerns. Instead, courts and Congress should continue to absorb the wisdom of the common law of tangible property
while crafting an IP-specific exhaustion policy that is attentive to the
specific costs and benefits of remote-control IP.
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